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This study analyzes the Marine Corps reenlistment process, and the relationship 
between a Marine’s expiration of active service (EAS), reenlistment request 
submission month, and submission timeline on the quality of first-term Marines. 
In 2011, a computed tier was added to reenlistment requests that provided an 
objective component to an otherwise subjective request. This study also looks at 
the influence of stakeholders in identifying and retaining quality under both 
reenlistment measures. 
Graphical trend analysis, cross tabulation, and linear regression models 
were used to analyze Total Force Retention System and Total Force Data 
Warehouse data with quality identified using a computed submitted tier, 
commander’s recommended tier, and modified tier score.  
The findings indicate that reenlistment requests submitted within 30 days 
of a Marine’s EAS have had negative effects on quality and outside of this 
window there is no observable effect on quality. Additionally, over the course of 
the reenlistment period, lower quality is associated with months following the 
start of the reenlistment period in July. The graphical analysis also suggests that 
the computed tier provides an objective anchor for commanders’ 
recommendations. 
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Why should we study retention? Recruiting efforts funnel life into the 
armed services, but retention is the effort that preserves the human capital 
developed. Retention efforts are internal recruiting measures. During a retention 
crisis in 2000, the Commandant of the Marine Corps at the time remarked, 
“Recruiting is hard work, retention equally so” (Goodrum, 2003, p. 26). This quote 
speaks to how retention efforts can be overlooked, but in reality, convincing the 
best to reenlist is much like a continuation of the recruiting that persuaded them 
to join the service in the first place. Military readiness is a function of the force 
size, occupation, and most importantly, quality (Koopman, 2007).  This state of 
readiness depends on the convergence of recruiting and retention of valuable 
personnel and the Marine Corps’ capability is in its personnel and not platforms. 
Since the Marine Corps spends a higher proportion of its budget on personnel 
than the other services, careful consideration should be given to identifying and 
retaining the best of the available human capital investment. 
The Marine Corps has taken measures within the last several years to 
improve its reenlistment practices and policies. The latest addition is the inclusion 
of an objective, computed tier evaluation portion on a Marine’s Reenlistment, 
Extension, and Lateral Move (RELM) request to help identify quality by ranking 
Marines against their peers within the same military occupational specialty 
(MOS). 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this study is to evaluate the computed tier 
system’s impacts on retaining quality personnel for Marine Corps first-term 
reenlistments. Prior to the computed tier’s implementation, reenlistment request 
acceptance relied on the timing of the application to secure a MOS boat space.  
The computed tier was added to RELMs to help identify quality and not just 
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accept the first to reenlist. I believe that the inclusion of the computed tier has 
improved quality of the enlisted force.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question involves assessing the retention of quality 
Marines within the established timeframe. How does quality change over the 
course of the reenlistment period for first-term Marines in relation to stakeholder 
incentives and under the recently implemented tier system? While exploring this 
question, Marine Corps policies are evaluated, assessing whether leadership at 
the unit level has the ability to identify and actively recruit the most qualified 
individuals to reenlist. The computed tier portion of RELMs now provides an 
objective quality component to an otherwise subjective request.  
Secondary research questions include  
 Where are incentives and objectives mismatched at each level of 
processing for stakeholders?  
 How does a Marine’s expiration of active service (EAS) impact the 
processing of their reenlistment request?  
 Does quality change over the course of the fiscal year to include 
the reenlistment periods and lateral move periods?  
 How has the quality of the enlisted force selected for reenlistment 
changed since the introduction of the tier evaluation system?  
In addition to the overall reenlistment process being evaluated, the parties 
involved and the effects of fiscal year timelines will be reviewed. 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Scope 
The focus of this study is on the population of first-term enlisted Marines 
from the past six fiscal years who applied for reenlistment and what quality is 
retained in relation to the demand signal output by the Enlisted Assignments 
branch (MMEA). The computed tier calculation and the commander’s 
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recommendation serve as indicators of quality. Assessing whether tier criteria are 
accurate measures of quality are beyond the scope of this study. 
Supplemental performance indicators relevant to study of the tier 
evaluation include Physical Fitness Test (PFT) scores, Combat Fitness Test 
(CFT) scores, proficiency and conduct markings, rifle scores, and Marine Corps 
Martial Arts Program (MCMAP) belt attainment, and meritorious promotion 
occasions. Misconduct such as non-judicial punishments (NJP) and courts-
martial are not included in the actual computation, but impose limitations on tier 
attainment.  
2. Limitations 
Since the tier system was recently implemented in fiscal year (FY) 2011, 
limited quantities of data exist on Marines evaluated using the objective 
component. Rifle and MCMAP belt scores were not archived in the Total Force 
Retention System (TFRS) because the computed portion was not a requirement. 
Additionally, prior to FY 2010, limited to no data exists on the CFT, which is 
another prime component in computing a current Marine’s individual score. 
Official scoring began in July 2009 for the CFT with a calendar year requirement 
initiated in January 2010 (USMC, CD&I, 2009). Discussion on how to remedy 
these issues is covered in detail in a later section. 
3. Assumptions 
The Marine Corps tier system was developed to differentiate levels of 
quality in the enlisted force and given this information; the performance indicators 
are assumed to be appropriate predictors of success and continued service.  
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review conducted sought different perspectives outside of 
the Marine Corps to include other services, government entities, and third-party 
research firms. Literature on enlisted populations is typically concerned with 
quantities and incentives to retain personnel rather than the quality of those 
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retained and the potential effects thereafter. Historically, quality is more of an 
emphasis during the recruiting phase of manpower development with a focus on 
attracting individuals with high school educational backgrounds and qualifying 
Armed Forces Qualification Tests (AFQT). These two attributes have consistently 
been used as performance indicators of success in the armed services since the 
inception of the all-volunteer force (AVF).  
F. ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY 
The manpower process is a complex system with recruiting and retention 
as key elements to the shaping and sustaining of end strength. The Marine 
Corps enlisted retention cycle is discussed from multiple perspectives as well as 
the evolution of the Marine Corps’ reenlistment and lateral move processes.  
Manpower and personnel considerations from within the past decade will 
provide the context for the emphasis on quality. The United States was focused 
on two wars abroad for close to a decade and now that mission is changing. As 
service members return from overseas, military strategy shifts, and budgetary 
issues continue to influence decision making, the size of the force is under 




General Amos, 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), issued in 
his planning guidance that Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) 
“Examine and improve reenlistment procedures,” to retain the most qualified 
instead of the “first to volunteer,” and simultaneously meet manpower 
requirements and goals (CMC, 2010, p. 14). Shortly thereafter, in May 2011, a 
Marine Administrative Message (MARADMIN) was released outlining the 
commandant’s Approved Updated Reenlistment Procedures which expanded the 
submission timeline for reenlistments to 90 days and introduced tier evaluation 
system in TFRS (USMC, 2011a). To better understand the importance and 
impacts of these changes, the following literature review covers the retention 
process, the progression of retention studies, and comparisons between the tier 
evaluation system and its preceding process in the Marine Corps.  
A. FIRST-TERM ALIGNMENT PLAN 
1. Mission 
The FY 2014 Enlisted Retention Guidelines published the following goal in 
June 2013: 
The purpose of our enlisted retention efforts is to meet the 
requirements of our enlisted career force by retaining Marines with 
proven performance and demonstrated potential. We will 
accomplish this by focusing on the retention process at every level 
of command and by providing all eligible Marines with 
comprehensive information regarding opportunities for further 
service. The end state is to meet all retention requirements with the 
most qualified Marines and to provide all Marines eligible to reenlist 
in FY 14 with personal interaction throughout their chain of 
command regarding opportunities for further service. (p. 1) 
The Enlisted Assignments branch at Manpower and Reserve Affairs 
publishes enlisted retention campaign guidelines annually and dissecting the 
commander’s intent above provides the mission of the retention process. The 
primary purposes of a retention campaign are to meet quantity and quality goals. 
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The “requirements of the career enlisted force” portion speaks to the quantity 
goal; however, “retaining Marines with proven performance and demonstrated 
potential” addresses that quantity in combination with the quality of the individual 
is the optimal solution.  
2. Purpose 
The involved nature of the retention process requires buy-in from 
participating stakeholders. As previously stated, the purpose of the enlisted 
retention campaign is only possible with support at “every level of command by 
providing all eligible Marines with comprehensive information regarding 
opportunity for future service.” The long-term perspective takes into account the 
career force. Individuals who fall under the first term alignment plan (FTAP) are 
still in their initial contract but are eligible for reenlistment since their EAS falls 
within the current fiscal year retention campaign (MMEA, 2013). The Marines we 
mentor and encourage today become tomorrow’s career force.  
3. End State 
Effective leadership is essential to achieving the end state. The Marine 
Corps needs to meet “all retention requirements” to fill the appropriate number of 
boat spaces, or MOS quotas allotted, and meet the requirement with the “most 
qualified” (MMEA, 2013). The role of command influencers and stakeholders in 
the reenlistment process will be discussed in greater detail. The guidance 
provided in the Enlisted Retention and Career Development Program order 
reinforces the importance of retention efforts. Note that a key component in the 
purpose is to “conduct quality interviews” (USMC, 2010a). This responsibility of 
personal contact and engagement is not placed specifically on any one individual 
to carry out, but the implication in Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1040.31 is that it is 
in the best interest of leadership to be engaged in the process.  
The primary purpose is to conduct quality interviews in order to 
reenlist First-Term Marines to meet our career force MOS 
requirements and to reenlist career Marines to sustain appropriate  
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career force experience levels…Without a strong retention program 
the Marine Corps could not accomplish its career force objectives. 
(p. 1-1)   
Processes change over time. The traditional retention process has been 
completed on a “first to volunteer” basis. This stands in contrast to fast-filling 
Marine Corps Enlisted Retention, First-Term Alignment Plan, Computed Tier, 
Reenlistment Quality, Career Planners, Total Force Retention System, Enlisted 
Career Force Planning military (FFM) occupational specialties that are processed 
through boards to ensure the retention of highly qualified Marines. Fast-filling 
MOS’s are identified at the start of the reenlistment period based off of historical 
trends. With the computed tier in place for a couple of cycles, an updated 
MARADMIN gave processing preference to tier 1 computed Marines in all MOS’s 
as a reward for their superior performance (USMC, 2013). Quantity is 
undoubtedly a constant goal as a function of military readiness, but the quality of 
the force has long-term implications for an organization that relies on an internal 
labor market. While it is evident that quality of the force is an identified priority in 
retention efforts, due consideration is also given to how retention, recruiting, and 
planning efforts interact in the manpower system to attain end strength.  
B. MARINE CORPS REENLISTMENT, EXTENSION, AND LATERAL 
MOVE REQUESTS 
Several stakeholders are involved in the processing of a RELM request. 
Key participants in the reenlistment process are career planners and 
commanders. Unit level career planners are special staff officers responsible for 
advising commanders and Marines on reenlistment matters and as unit liaisons 
to the Enlisted Assignments branch (USMC, 2010a). Career planners are 
Marines who conducted a lateral move into the 4821 MOS community and while 
their role in the reenlistment process is significant, they contribute only a portion 
of the effort needed to retain an eligible Marine.  
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 Marine Corps Reenlistment Process (after J. Gayman, Personal Figure 1. 
Communication, February 20, 2014) 
Commanders are responsible for the successful implementation of a 
career planning program which includes retention (USMC, 2010a). To assist 
them in this objective, unit career planners and unit leadership have the ability to 
positively influence a unit’s career planning program through daily interaction with 
their subordinates considering future service in the Marine Corps (USMC, 
2010a). The influence that unit leaders exert on their subordinates should not be 
overlooked. Every RELM request that is processed by a unit career planner 
contains recommendations from key personnel in a Marine’s chain of command 
and is endorsed by the unit’s commander before submission via TFRS to MMEA.  
The typical routing process starts with the Marines, as depicted in 
Figure 1.  After meeting with a career planner, the Marine can initiate a RELM 
request which must be reviewed and signed off by various staff sections to verify 
basic eligibility in areas such as security clearance, legal, and height and weight 
requirements. The Marine’s chain of command, both officers and enlisted, also 
comment on the RELM and support their recommendation with amplifying 
comments. The final stop before submission to Headquarters Marine Corps 
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(HQMC) is with the unit commanding officer and sergeant major. The 
commanding officer makes a final recommendation that takes into consideration 
the previous comments and the career planner submits the completed package 
for consideration by MMEA.  
At HQMC, the RELM is reviewed for quality control by career planner 
liaisons in the Enlisted Assignments branch. The routing of the RELM now 
depends upon the context of the reenlistment request. If there is no misconduct 
during the enlistment, the package is routed through the MOS monitor who 
weighs in on the competitiveness of the package within the requested 
occupational specialty. The FTAP chief has the authority to approve the package 
if the RELM meets all prerequisites.  
If the RELM contains misconduct, which includes non-judicial punishment 
or higher, during the enlistment period or is negatively endorsed by the unit 
commanding officer, the request is still routed through the MOS monitor, but also 
the MOS monitor officer-in-charge (OIC) before review by the FTAP chief and 
FTAP OIC. The MMEA-6 head determines the final disposition of the RELM 
based on all previous recommendations. 
1. Pre-tier Process 
Prior to the computer tier, unit career planners managed RELM requests, 
while the chain of command endorsed the package, and were ultimately 
submitted with a final recommendation to HQMC by the requesting Marine’s unit 
commander. A commander’s endorsement could range from most favorable to 
least favorable using one of four verbal descriptions of the RELM to qualify their 
recommendation: enthusiastically recommended, recommended with confidence, 
recommended with reservation, or not recommended. The processing of 
reenlistment packages was based on a first to volunteer basis with no 
prioritization based on recommendation. Exception to this policy included fast 
filling MOS’s which were MOS’s with higher supply than available boat spaces. 
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Interest in these MOS’s created designated submission periods and boards to 
select quality and is still in use today.  
2. Computed Tier Process 
The score from a computed tier resembles the structure of a Marine Corps 
composite score for promotion purposes. An individual’s composite score 
consists of various performance metrics from test scores to performance and 
conduct evaluations while also accounting for one’s time in grade and service 
(USMC, 2012). The Enlisted Promotion Manual, Marine Corps Order 1400.32D, 
with change 2, regulates the number of Marines to be promoted to corporal and 
sergeant through the automated composite score (2-27).  
 
 Composite Score Computation (from USMC, 2012). Figure 2. 
The composite score, by definition, is a mathematical score using 
recorded data in an individual’s total force record for Marine Corps wide 
comparison to other individuals within a particular grade and MOS (USMC, 
2012).  Note that the criteria in Figure 2, listed in bold, are shared with the 
computed tier. The addition of a Marine’s rifle, PFT, and CFT are considered part 
of a general military proficiency score. The general military proficiency score is 
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multiplied by 100 and added to the remaining scores. Average proficiency and 
conduct scores are multiplied by 100 while time in grade and time in service are 
also multiplied by factors with a Marine’s time in grade holding more weight.  
Bonus points are offered as incentives for special duty assignments, education, 
and recruiting experiences. 
After all components of the composite score are calculated, this value is 
compared to the cutting score for the Marine’s MOS. Composite scores within the 
MOS that exceed the cutting score threshold are promoted to the next pay grade. 
If the Marine Corps is at maximum capacity for a particular skill set, then the 
MOS will be listed as “closed,” with no four digit composite score, and therefore, 
no promotions go into effect that month. 
The computed tier was introduced in May 2011 through MARADMIN 
273/11. This change in policy created an objective component alongside the 
traditional subjective recommendations from the Marine’s leadership. The 
computed tier takes into account many of the same scores as a composite score, 
but specifically, the physical fitness test, the combat fitness test, proficiency and 
conduct markings, and rifle marksmanship scores. If a Marine was meritoriously 
promoted during their enlistment, an additional 100 points is added to their 
overall standing. Under the present process, Marines who apply for reenlistment 
are compared to their peers who belong to the same enlistment cohort, within 
their MOS. Application of the computed tier can be seen in Figure 3.  
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 Marine Corps Tier Worksheet (after B. Lodge, Personal Figure 3. 
Communication, February 9, 2014) 
The PFT, CFT, and rifle score values are not altered in the computed tier 
score. Proficiency and conduct marks are multiplied by 100 when added in the 
formula and each MCMAP belt level is associated with a certain number of 
points. If a reenlistment package contains misconduct, such as a non-judicial 
punishment (NJP) or higher, the computed tier for that Marine is limited based on 
the context of the RELM. Marines with an NJP cannot attain a computed tier 
higher than 2. Marines with two NJPs or record of conviction via courts-martial 
cannot be higher than a tier 3. The sum of all categories creates a four digit score 
for the Marine and is compared to their peers within the same MOS. The 
proportions for each tier category are preset but the cut-off scores for each 
percentile vary each year.  
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3. Stakeholders 
The success of the Marine Corps retention program relies upon the 
combined efforts of all stakeholders involved. The roles and responsibilities of 
each stakeholder are listed below.  
a. Career Planners 
A retention crisis in 2000 prompted the Commandant of the Marine Corps 
to direct a two-day Marine Corps wide retention stand down (Goodrum, 2003). 
The Enlisted Retention Task Force (ERTF) developed by the Deputy 
Commandant, M&RA recommended the replication of Recruiting Command’s 
program successes through the development of a systematic program for 
retention (Goodrum, 2003). As a result of the ERTF, M&RA created the 8421 
MOS for, then, career retention specialists (Goodrum, 2003). In May 2010, the 
name for, now 4821s, was changed to career planners (USMC, 2010b). All 
career planners are Marines who have conducted a lateral move into the career 
retention field (Goodrum, 2003).  With a dedicated MOS, the Marine Corps 
developed a dedicated force to help manage the retention process.  
Career planners answer to three different stakeholders: the Marine 
reenlisting, their unit commander, and HQMC. The full-time effort of dedicated 
career planners is essential to sustaining the career force through not only FTAP 
candidates but also subsequent term alignment plan (STAP) Marines. In a nod to 
recruiting practices and to enhance their visibility and status, career planners are 
also provided with an additional clothing allowance to wear the dress blue 
uniform as prescribed (USMC, 2010a).  
b. FTAP Marine:  
A typical enlistment is four years for an FTAP candidate but there are 
exceptions for additional observation or special programs (USMC, 2010a). The 
minimum and maximum ages for recruits are 17 and 29, respectively 
(http://www.marines.com/eligibility/requirements). After practically four years’ 
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time in service, an eligible FTAP Marine can range in age from 21 to 33 years 
old. Understandably, reenlistment decisions can be difficult when the 
commitment to reenlist entails committing another four years or possibly longer to 
an organization.  
Although the objective of this study is not to analyze reenlistment patterns 
or behaviors, it is relevant to address the incentives for when individuals submit 
their reenlistment requests. Individuals, who have fewer opportunities in the 
civilian sector or consider their current military career to be in jeopardy, may be 
more inclined to submit for reenlistment earlier than those who have more 
options at their disposal. In contrast, a Marine who is confident in their position in 
the Marine Corps as well as external opportunities in the civilian sector may 
choose to postpone their reenlistment while evaluating multiple options. During a 
period of significant drawdown, the most prudent decision by a Marine of either 
caliber would be to pursue opportunities in both sectors. The two extremes 
illustrate potentially perverse incentives through a rolling reenlistment process.  
c. Small Unit Leaders 
In addition to daily counseling and supervisory responsibilities, officers in 
charge and staff noncommissioned officers in charge have influence on a 
Marine’s decision to reenlist. Recommendations from key leadership within the 
Marine’s chain of command are collected on the RELM request form prior to 
submission to the unit sergeant major for review and the commander for final 
recommendation. This also includes NCOs, company commanders, other 
sections, but the recommendations for future service influence the unit 
commander who may or may not know the Marine’s full potential depending on 
the unit’s size. 
d. Unit Commanders 
The final recommendation provided by the commander, or the executive 
officer on his or her behalf holds a considerable amount of weight. The 
recommendation prior to the computed tier was heavily relied upon in itself for 
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the reenlistment disposition. With the addition of the computed tier, the 
commander’s recommendation has the latitude to override the objective tier 
based on observation. The commander’s recommendation should take into 
account the Marine’s performance and potential for future service (USMC, 
2010a).  
e. Monitors 
Monitors belong to MMEA-8, a section adjacent to the enlisted retention 
within the Enlisted Assignments branch. In the reenlistment process they are 
kept abreast of any issues or fluctuations in MOS populations that can affect duty 
assignments. In the case of RELMs with misconduct or that were negatively 
endorsed by the unit commander, the monitor provides recommendations to 
MMEA-6 on the competitiveness of the Marine within their MOS and the needs of 
the Marine Corps with respect to assignments.  
f. Career Planner Liaisons  
These career 4821 MOS Marines provide quality control for reenlistment 
packages that are submitted to MMEA from units across the Marine Corps. 
Career planner liaisons are the first stop for administrative corrections following a 
unit’s submission.  
g. MMEA-6 
The enlisted retention section within the Enlisted Assignments branch is 
responsible to the CMC for the career planning program (USMC, 2010a).  
Subordinate units within MMEA-6 manage the ERTF, FTAP, STAP, career 
counseling, and many other programs and policies. The head of MMEA-6 is the 
decision authority on RELMs with misconduct or that were negatively endorsed.  
C. NAVY REENLISTMENT PROCESS COMPARISON 
The United States Navy developed a centrally controlled program in 2003 
to shape the enlisted force composition (Koopman, 2007). Koopman describes 
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the Perform to Serve (PTS) program as a “centrally controlled, application 
reenlistment system with the goal of shaping the force through the movement of 
sailors from over manned to undermanned ratings and to manage the quality of 
those who reenlist by controlling the authority for reenlistment” (Koopman, 2007).  
The Marine Corps will rapidly approve lateral move request into high demand/low 
density MOS’s, but the emphasis is first on primary MOS populations.  
The algorithm used in this centrally controlled system was not transparent 
to sailors and their leadership (Koopman, 2007). In contrast, the tier computation 
formula for Marines is available on the RELM and displays the performance 
metrics, which are used with input from the individual’s personal record. 
Comparison to the Marine’s peers is published at the unit level, and the 
calculation is generated for all Marines with the current reenlistment cohort.  
Koopman states that the only two ways to improve retention quality is 
through pay incentives and a centralized reenlistment system based on quality 
(Koopman, 2007). Pay incentives vary by occupational specialty supply within 
respective service branches and so do the systems by which to identify such 
quality enlistees; however, the only consistent reward for superior performance, 
which can be linked to quality of the individual, are promotion processes 
(Koopman, 2007).   
In many ways, the Marine Corps computed tier mimics the promotion 
process in place for E-4s and below. For each MOS, a cutting score is generated 
which serves as the cut-off point for those eligible for promotion. The individual 
Marine has a composite score based on their performance metrics and time in 
service and grade. If a Marine’s individual composite score exceeds the 
established cutting score for that month, and all other minimum time in grade and 
service requirements, then they are promoted.  
The Navy differs from this approach in that promotion algorithms are 
generated from advancement exams, previous exam scores, promotion 
recommendations, and awards (Koopman, 2007). PTS was modified during its 
 17 
implementation to measure performance at the time of reenlistment (Koopman, 
2007). This modification is particularly important since Sailors who applied under 
PTS were compared to other Sailors within their enlisted manning community 
during the month they chose to reenlist. In contrast, Marines who reenlist under 
the computed tier system are compared to their peers within their MOS, who are 
from the same year cohort.   
D. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
1. Behavior Studies 
Previous studies include assessments on cost, psychological and 
sociological behaviors. Reenlistment decisions are personal decisions. 
Workplace and personal compensation is frequently studied to identify how to 
incentivize high performers to stay with an organization (retention behavior). A 
previous analysis of retention surveys indicates that basic pay, job security, 
retirement pay, job enjoyment, and medical care are key factors in an individual’s 
decision to stay military (Kocher & Thomas, 2000).  What is also important in a 
Marine’s decision to stay is shared values and pride in the Marine Corps (Kocher 
& Thomas, 2000).  
2. Economic Models 
One of the earliest studies on reenlistment behavior using economic 
theory was the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model (Weiss et al., 2002). 
ACOL attempted to compare pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors of the military 
versus civilian options. Reenlistment models like ACOL are beneficial to study 
the effects of pay and bonuses for short-term reenlistment projections (Quester & 
Thomason, 1984). Another model created to study reenlistment behavior 
compared civilian occupations to Navy specialties estimating long-term 
projections using historical relationships (Quester & Thomason, 1984). Previous 
multivariate models have focused on pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors that 
influence a service member’s decision to stay in the military (Weiss et al., 2002).  
 18 
This study focuses on a process for identifying quality and not whether current 
practices serve as an appropriate means for incentivizing retention.  
3. Definitions of Quality 
While many studies have focused on the reenlistment behavior of service 
members, the definition of quality has consistently been gauged by an 
individual’s AFQT and education attainment (Koopman, 2007).  The AFQT is a 
composite score constructed from elements in the Armed Service Vocational 
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) for service potential and the only score that the Marine 
Corps shares with its sister services (USMC, M&RA, 2009). While the AFQT may 
be a good indicator for completion of a first term, this may not be the best 
indicator for person-organization fit and potential for future service. A study of the 
Navy’s PTS program found that in certain months, the average AFQT scores for 
those disapproved for reenlistment were higher than those approved (Brookshire, 
2007). If the definition of quality is primarily based on a predictor of success like 
AFQT then this statistic could appear troubling.  The Marine Corps defines 
aptitude through a general technical (GT) calculation whose formula is specific to 
the Corps and should not be confused with other services’ GT scores (USMC, 
M&RA, 2009).  
4. Recruiting Quality 
Benchmarks for quality recruits have traditionally included an individual’s 
AFQT score and high school diploma graduation status (Kapp, 2013). The AFQT 
is the only composite score that the Marine Corps shares in common with its 
sister services (USMC, M&RA, 2009). Subcomponents of the AFQT are derived 
from the ASVAB, which tests an individual’s developed abilities and is a measure 
of one’s academic and occupational success for military placement (official-
ASVAB.com). Again, quality is stressed more so for recruits than during the 
retention phase.  
As recently as FY 2011 and 2012, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force 
saw the highest recruit quality levels since the beginning of the all-volunteer force 
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(Kapp, 2013). While recruiting quality goals focus on surpassing 60% above 
average scores on the AFQT and greater than 90% high school diploma 
graduates, the performance metric for retention has been primarily quantitative in 
nature (Kapp, 2013).  
Testimony from the 2009 House Armed Services Committee hearing on 
recruiting and retention in the military services referred to the increase of active 
component reenlistment in the Marine Corps from 31% in FY 2007 to 36% in FY 
2008 (Recruiting, Retention, and End Strength Overview, 2009). While increases 
in volunteers are notable, the factors that motivate volunteers to reenlist may not 
necessarily attract the right person for the organization. Selective reenlistment 
bonuses (SRB) are also used to assist with retention efforts; however, the use of 
SRBs to target the retention of certain skills sets speaks to the issue of attaining 
the right quantity of skills sets and to a lesser extent, quality (Recruiting, 
Retention, and End Strength Overview, 2009). Monetary compensation may not 
always attract the best qualified, but it does provide add some level of 
attractiveness to military service in comparison to civilian alternatives.  
5. Relationship to Recruiting  
Today’s accession cohort is tomorrow’s FTAP retention cohort. As a 
closed system, the quantity and quality of recruit that is obtained by the military 
service will be, provided the individual completes the first enlistment, the 
available pool for retention and advancement in the career force.  Recruiting is 
considered the “life blood” of the military since entry-level personnel ultimately 
develop and advance to positions of authority in the hierarchical rank structure 
(Kapp, 2013).  
From 2004-2007, the security situation in Iraq resulted in about 700 armed 
service member casualties a year (Kapp, 2013). These numbers would drop 
significantly even when casualties in Afghanistan rose (Kapp, 2013).  The 
increased role and risk apparent to service members during overseas conflicts 
strained recruiting efforts. During high operational tempo periods, from FY 2005-
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2007, recruiting efforts were challenged and some service branches began to 
accept lower quality recruits in order to meet quotas (Kapp, 2013). The surge in 
demand for manpower created a focus on quantity and on average; this can 
cause aggregate quality to decrease.   
Another concern surrounding recruiting efforts, as noted in testimony by 
all-volunteer force expert Dr. Curtis Gilroy, from the House of Representatives 
Armed Services Committee hearing of 2009, is that youth influencers have 
changed over time. Eligible youths are less likely to be influenced to join military 
service and even after all qualifiers are applied, only 25% of the targeted 
population is eligible for service (Recruiting, Retention, and End Strength 
Overview, 2009). At the time this statement was made in 2009, it was forecasted 
that budgetary issues on the horizon, which is being experienced now, would be 
directed at recruiting and retention programs with a subsequent draw down in 
forces (Recruiting, Retention, and End Strength Overview, 2009).  
What is also notable about Marine Corps recruiting efforts is that during 
the manpower build-up to support and sustain operations abroad by meeting a 
force structure of 202,000, the Corps attained this goal two years ahead of 
schedule (Recruiting, Retention, and End Strength Overview, 2009). The unique 
recruiting campaigns for the Marine Corps and historical consistency in this 
arena of the manpower realm have helped provide a steady supply of individuals 
for the reenlistment pool.  Out of all the services, the Marine Corps also has 
higher proportions of active enlisted Marines in their first-term enlistment which 
implies a larger pool of eligible candidates for career service (Congressional 
Budget Office [CBO], 2006). With a bottom heavy pyramid force structure, the 
Marine Corps has the latitude to be more selective in the quality of Marine that 
reenlists.  
E. HISTORICAL AND MANAGERIAL RELEVANCE 
Quality can become the center of attention during drawdown periods. As 
major military operations in the Middle East come to a close, the military services 
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are poised to reduce forces much like the response to the close of the Cold War. 
Fewer personnel and thus, smaller recruiting and retention goals, were products 
of the late 1990s. What also accompanied the drawdown were a burgeoning 
civilian economy, better wages, education opportunities, and changes in 
demographics (Kapp, 2013).  
Downsizing can be a result of decreased demand for an organization’s 
services or conversely, when an organization is flourishing but aims to increase 
operating efficiencies (Chadwick, Hunter, & Walston, 2004). The former scenario 
rather than the latter applies to the Marine Corps. From a human resource 
perspective, the preservation of human and social capital is important to 
sustaining a competitive advantage. Downsizing in a fiscally constrained 
environment may assist with direct labors costs initially; however, strategic 
human resource management points to lowered long-term competitive 
advantage, in terms of productivity, if required skills and organizational structures 
are removed carelessly (Chadwick, Hunter, & Walston, 2004). 
1. Recent Past 
Ongoing military operations in the Middle East since 2001 increased 
operational tempo, mobilization of reserves, and casualties and led many to 
speculate that recruiting and retention rates would be negatively affected (Kapp, 
2013). In fact, recruiting efforts in FY 2005-2007 for the Department of Defense 
suffered slightly and some of the military services accepted lower levels of 
recruiting to meet established quotas (Kapp, 2013). In 2008, the civilian economy 
and its high unemployment rate boosted recruiting and retention efforts once 
again (Kapp, 2013).  
2. Marine Corps’ Current Standings 
For the past decade, the Marine Corps has met or exceeded retention 
goals (Kapp, 2013). Retention efforts, in a way, are like a second round of 
recruiting and have been positively affected by the same factors that have led to 
positive recruiting outcomes (Kapp, 2013).  The Marine Corps focus for FY 2014 
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efforts is not only on quantity, but quality as the drawdown goes into effect. An 
update to the FY 2014 Enlisted Retention Campaign was published in January 
2014 and shifted the reenlistment submission deadline far to the left (USMC, 
2014). The MARADMIN states that quality in the retained force is increasing and 
reenlistment opportunities are limited with a new force structure of 188,500 at the 
end of FY 2014 (USMC, 2014).  
3. Future 
There is a delicate balance to maintain in military retention. In this closed 
system, if too many service members stay in, then promotions slow and force 
shaping measures such as voluntary and involuntary separations come into play; 
meanwhile, if too many service members depart, then the experience inventory 
dries up and the manpower system takes years to recuperate (Kapp, 2013). 
These issues have also been compounded by changes to structure requirements 




A. DATA OVERVIEW 
MMEA provided pooled, cross-sectional data from TFRS grouped by 
reenlistment era. Data from FY 2009 to 2011 captures the pre-tier reenlistment 
process while data from FY 2013 to 2014 captures the computed tier 
reenlistment process. Data from FY 2012 was not available from TFRS due to a 
system migration and associated corruption issues. Data from FY 2014 is 
truncated to February 2014 only because the reenlistment period is still in effect 
at the time of this study. Each fiscal year contains individual data on Marines who 
applied for reenlistment and were subsequently disapproved, declined an offer to 
reenlist, or chose to accept reenlistment. Figure 4 shows the outcomes for each 
step in the reenlistment process, given that an individual survives to the 
reenlistment decision point.  
 
  Personnel Flow in the Reenlistment Process Figure 4. 
 24 
The Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) also provided data for this 
study on the entire reenlistment population for FY 2009 to 2011. This data was 
requested to replicate the computed tier formula. Since computed tiers are now 
generated for all Marines, regardless of their decision to apply for reenlistment, 
this data was necessary in order to generate the same tier proportions for 
reenlistment data prior to the computed tier. Pre-tier data contains a 
commander’s recommendation which is equivalent to today’s recommended tier, 
but there is no calculated tier score at the time of submission. Data from TFDW 
was also required to match existing TFRS data with individual performance data 
not previously archived for reenlistment requests.  
The focus of this study was the Marine Corps’ FTAP population for three 
years prior to the computer tier and the first three years using the computed tier 
to determine the effects on identifying and retaining quality. Prior Service 
Enlistment Program Marines and combat wounded reenlistment requests were 
excluded from the reenlistment sample. I also excluded observations that did not 
fall within each respective fiscal year’s reenlistment window of July 1st, from the 
previous fiscal year, to 30 September of the reenlistment fiscal year. This 
exclusion included Marines with submission dates outside of the reenlistment 
window and EAS’s outside of the reenlistment fiscal year. The totals in Table 1 
are the number of individuals who applied for reenlistment and whose information 
is archived by MMEA-6. The totals in Table 2 show the usable number of 
observations for entire reenlistment cohorts from FY 2009 to 2011. I generated a 
modified tier scores for all observations using only PFT and proficiency and 
conduct marks. Using the modified tier scores, I was able to create cutoff score 
for tiers using the FTAP populations. These cutoff scores were applied to 
reenlistment pre-tier data to create computed submitted tiers for regression 
analysis. 
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 Data Totals for each Fiscal Year  Table 1.  
 
 Data Used to Determine Tier Cutoffs Using Complete Reenlistment Table 2.  
Cohorts (FY 2009-2011)1 
 
 
1. Independent Variables 
Primary variables of interest include a Marine’s PFT score, CFT score, 
rifle score, MCMAP belt attainment, proficiency and conduct markings, RELM 
status, EAS date, RELM submission month, time between EAS and RELM 
submission date, submitted tier, and commander’s recommended tier. Table 3 
contains a list of all available independent variables with descriptions.  
                                            
1 Many FY 2009 individual records had zeroes or missing values for PFT scores or proficiency 
and conduct marks and were subsequently omitted.  
 26 
 Variable Listing with Descriptions Table 3.  
 
Tables 4 through 7 contain the summary statistics for each independent 
variable used in regression and cross-tabulation analysis. Summary statistics are 
grouped by fiscal year and computed tier usage. 
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2. Issues and Remedies 
Some observations from FY 2009-2010 lack CFT data because the 
program was being introduced across the Marine Corps. According to 
MARADMIN 476/09, scoring began in July 2009, but mandatory testing for all 
Marines did not begin until calendar year 2010. In order to simulate the use of a 
computed tier score for pre-tier data, PFT, proficiency and conduct marks, and 
misconduct issues were used to estimate each applicant’s score. Additionally, 
observations in fiscal years 2009 to 2011 from TFRS do not contain rifle scores, 
MCMAP belt scores, or data on meritorious promotions since there was no 
requirement to compute an objective tier. Matching data from TFRS with data 
archived in TFDW was not possible for either category due to time constraints 
and availability. 
Marines who applied for reenlistment but were disapproved lack 
information regarding the MOS in which they applied for reenlistment. Analysis 
on the quality leaving a particular MOS, during certain time periods is possible, 
but any further analysis into a disapproved Marine’s intended MOS, and possibly 
a lateral move, is not feasible.  
B. TECHNIQUES APPLIED 
1. Correlation Matrices 
I analyze trends in performance metrics and determine the relationship 
between these metrics in the computed tier using a correlation matrix. The 
relationships are significant for this analysis since pre-tier reenlistment requests 
submitted in TFRS did not archive rifle and MCMAP performance metrics. 
Matching data from TFDW with the pre-tier records to replicate the computed tier 
was attempted but was not successful due to time constraints. A product of the 
correlation matrices was the validation of certain performance metrics as 
adequate components for a modified submitted tier. I did obtain data on the 
entire FY 2009 to 2011 reenlistment cohorts to create modified tier cutoffs using 
PFT scores and proficiency and conduct marks. The modified submitted tier does 
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account for the effects of conduct issues in a Marine’s record, but not their 
standing within their MOS.  
2. Tier Replication and Difference in Difference Analysis 
To provide initial comparisons between measures of quality used by each 
reenlistment system, the tier evaluation formula was applied to pre-tier data to 
measure the quality of individuals approved. I also constructed a difference in 
difference matrix to highlight differences between the pre-tier evaluations and 
computed tier evaluations. The aim is to compare acceptance rates for 
reenlistment based on the submitted evaluation and the frequency distributions of 
quality as defined during their respective periods.  
3. Regression Analysis 
A more comprehensive analysis using linear regression evaluates the 
relationship between an individual’s EAS versus their reenlistment processing 
time and the effects on quality retained by the force. By incorporating EAS dates, 
submission months, scored tier, fiscal year, and interactions between timelines, 
the effects of quality in relation to submission will be determined. Demographics 
and the effects on specific MOS communities were not addressed in this initial 




A. DATA TRENDS 
TFRS provided the primary sets of data used for analysis, and although 
many of the fields were the same for pre-tier data and computed tier data, the 
standard used to rate a Marine’s overall quality changed. Pre-tier data relied 
solely on the commander’s subjective evaluation. Computed tier data combines 
the commander’s subjective evaluation with an objective score from the tier 
calculation. Additionally, data archived under the pre-tier system did not record 
an individual’s MCMAP, rifle scores, or meritorious promotion history.  
The trends in performance metrics that are used to determine a reenlisting 
Marine’s tier are presented in figures 5 through 11 and Table 10 compare 
Marines approved for reenlistment under the pre-tier and computed tier 
reenlistment processes. Corresponding graphs for MCMAP belts and rifle scores 
are not provided for FY 2009 to 2011 due to gaps in the provided data. The 
limited number of CFT scores from FY 2010 and FY 2011 are provided for 
comparison against computed tier data. I focused on the trends in categories that 
were ultimately incorporated into the modified submitted tier: PFT, proficiency 
marks, and conduct marks.   
Figure 5 shows the upward trend in PFT and CFT scores. The average 
PFT score for Marines who were approved for reenlistment rose from 249 to 258. 
Likewise, the average CFT rose from 244 to 289. The higher increase in CFTs is 
attributed to the implementation and maturation of the test. Additionally, the 
higher average for CFT scores is also expected since the cutoff for a first-class 
score is higher than its PFT counterpart.  
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 Trends in PFT and CFT Scores for Approved Marines between Pre-Figure 5. 
Tier and Computed Tier Data 2 
In Figure 6, proficiency and conduct marks between pre-tier and computed 
tier data show very little variation in scores. The lack of variation is not surprising 
given that the average Marine recruit, in accordance with the IRAM, has 
proficiency and conduct marks of 4.2 and 4.2, on a 0 to 5.0 scale (USMC, 2000). 
The averages for Marines approved for reenlistment during both periods are 
above average by definition.   
                                            
2 Limited CFT data existed for pre-tier observations. The average presented is a representation 
of partial data from FY 2010 and 2011. 
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 Trends in Proficiency and Conduct Marks for Approved Marines Figure 6. 
between Pre-Tier and Computed Tier Data  
B. CORRELATION MATRICES 
The correlation matrix seen in Table 8, for computed tier data, found that 
PFT and proficiency and conduct markings were more correlated with higher tiers 
and presumably higher quality. The performance data from PFT scores may be 
more reliable since the test as a metric has been used for decades and, in 
contrast, the CFT is only several years old.  
  















 Correlation Matrix for 2013-2014 Reenlistment Data3 Table 8.  
 
 
The high correlation of proficiency and conduct marks is not surprising 
given that a commander must rely upon the recommendations of his or her 
subordinate leaders but the record of the individual as it stands during a request 
to reenlist. Additionally, proficiency and conduct values are multiplied by 100 
before addition into the computed tier score. Average Marine recruit markings in 
accordance with the IRAM are 4.2 in proficiency and 4.2 in conduct (4-39, 4-42). 
Once these values are increased by a factor of 100, their total value naturally 
makes up a larger proportion of the computed tier score. PFT and CFT cannot 
exceed 300 points for each test.  
Surprisingly, a Marine’s rifle score, which can range from 0 to 345, was 
less correlated with a computed tier score than the MCMAP belt and seems 
counterintuitive to the phrase, “Every Marine a Rifleman.” The point system for 
MCMAP belt attainment ranges from 5 to 95 points. The MCMAP belt point 
average is 18 points and stands between the green and brown belts. In 
comparison to rough computed tier scores, 18 points is less than one percent of 
a Marine’s overall evaluation. The differences in correlation strength may indicate 
the significance of marksmanship based on MOS. Marines certify annually for 
marksmanship. Proficiency in marksmanship is limited based on time and 
                                            
3 Note that the highest computed submitted tier value is “1,” and therefore, the correlation values 
for all of the characteristics are negative. In this case, a lower computed tier indicates better 
quality.  
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resources allocated to each unit; whereas, a Marine can generally seek self-
improvement for MCMAP or the PFT/CFT on a daily basis rather than only at an 
annual training evolution.  
If anything, the MCMAP belt may be appropriate for inclusion as an 
indicator for motivation or persistence, but not as a measure of proficiency in 
grade or MOS. The presence of meritorious promotion in the computed tier, in 
theory, provides the same indicator for continued service as opposed to just 
successful completion. A limitation of this study is that the meritorious promotion 
data was not available for analysis.   
Breaking down each of the components within the tier and from TFDW 
data merged with TFRS allows the comparison of individual tiers components 
and a descriptive analysis of certain qualities over time. The overall increase in 
each category’s scores may be a reflection of external influences, say the poor 
economy, rather than an improvement in reenlistment procedures or stakeholder 
buy-in.  
Another metric of quality is the number of misconduct issues that are 
present in reenlistment packages. The summary statistics in Tables 4 through 7 
show that the misconduct count in submissions has decreased from 15.1% to 
9.5%. Stakeholders from unit leaders to monitors at MMEA-8 and the decision 
authority at MMEA-6 weigh-in on the importance of retaining an individual with 
conduct in their record. Not only does the computed tier account for significant 
conduct issue like NJPs or courts-martial, but then the RELMs with conduct are 
routed differently from their counterparts.  
C. TIER REPLICATION 
Comparing the data from both reenlistment processes can be completed 
in multiple ways. The commander’s recommendation and the commander’s 
recommended tier can be viewed as equivalent measures. Comparing the 
acceptance rates of Marines based on purely subjective recommendations 
shows how much weight was given to a commander’s comments. From this 
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analysis, a commander’s recommendation has significant weight in determining a 
Marine’s eligibility to reenlist. The benefit of the computed tier is that the ranking 
and eligibility of the Marine is placed in context through a comparison against 
their peers within their MOS who will continue to compete with them for future 
career opportunities, if accepted.  
After determining factors that weigh heavily into the determination of a 
Marine’s computed tier score, I replicate the computed tier on pre-tier data. 
Fortunately, data on PFTs and proficiency and conduct marks were available for 
FY 2009 to 2011 reenlistment data. Using full reenlist cohort data from TFDW 
containing PFT and proficiency and conduct marks for all eligible FTAP Marines, 
I was able to construct a modified computed tier. Observations lacking scores in 
the three areas were not used to generate the modified tier. The cutoff scores 
were generated by multiplying the total number of observations for each year by 
the proportions established for each tier. For example, tier 1 scores include only 
the top 10% of the reenlistment population, the next 30% are tier 2 Marines, and 
so on. The modified tier cutoff scores, as shown again in Table 9, for FY 2009 to 
2011 were similar. These scores are the product of category averages. Once 
applied to existing reenlistment data, the penalties on conduct, or jeopardy, were 
also factored into the modified “computed submitted tier.” Again, the modified 
submitted tier score is not specific to each MOS and provides an average tier 
score. Table 9 provides the cutoff scores for each year. 
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 FY 2009-2011 Generated Cutoff Tier Scores Table 9.  
 
 
The distribution of commander’s recommendations, from FY 2009-2011 in 
Figure 7, shows that 73% of approved reenlistment requests were recommended 
with enthusiasm when submitted to MMEA.  The recommended with confidence 
category followed with 24% of observations and before the modified computed 
tier is applied, the recommendation distribution is skewed.  
In Figure 8, I compare the distribution of modified computed tiers, as 
applied to FY 2009-2011 pre-tier data, to computed tier data from FY 2011-2013. 
The proportion of Marines approved for reenlistment changes significantly. Under 
the pre-tier process, 18% of approvals are ranked in the first tier and followed by 
52% in the second tier. The observations have a more central tendency following 
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Looking at the percent approved of submitted by tier in Figure 9, the pre-
tier approval percentage for each category did not fall below 92%. With the 
application of the computed submitted tier the percent approve does decrease as 
the respective level of quality decreases. The range of percent approved, from 
lowest to highest quality, is now from 69% to 99% instead of 92% to 96%. The 
small variation in approval percentages for pre-tier data suggests that limited 
differentiation occurred between reenlistment requests. Even with the computed 
tier, 69% of tier 4 Marines, who are in the bottom 10%, are still approved for 
reenlistment. 
 
 Percent Approved of Submitted, by Tier  Figure 9. 
The modified computed tier is compared against commander’s 
recommended tier in Figure 10. Numeric values were assigned to the 
commander’s recommendation for pre-tier data, with “enthusiastically 
recommended” indicated as tier 1. An overwhelming number of Marines are 
enthusiastically recommended within every modified computed tier category. This 
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performance when providing a subjective recommendation. In this instance, in 
order to obtain an objective perspective on the Marine reenlisting, the 
commander would have to gather performance metrics on the individual as well 
their peers. The addition of the submitted computed tier provides an objective 
anchor for commander’s to make better informed recommendations.  
 
 
 Modified Computed Tier vs. Commander’s Recommended Tier for Figure 10. 
Approved Reenlistments FY 2009-2011  
Figure 11 illustrates the results of providing this objective assessment to 
commanders during the reenlistment process. In Figure 11, if a Marine’s 
computed tier was calculated to be a certain value, a commander is more likely 
to recommend an elevation of tier quality, or concur with the calculated tier, 
rather than suggest a downgrade in tier. This reflects what is seen in Figure 10 
with pre-tier data where commanders are continuing to inflate their Marine’s 
performance; however, this tendency has been tempered by the availability of the 
objective computed tier. For example, in the entire computed tier population, the 
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percent. Of the Marines who were computed as tier 3, commanders 
recommended that over 45 percent of those individuals be elevated to tier 1 or 
tier 2. The biggest disparity between commander’s rankings and the computation 
is within the tier 4 category. Over 70 percent of commanders’ recommendations 
were for increases to higher tier levels. Given the tendency to inflate a Marine’s 
quality rating, in cases where a commander decides to decrease a Marine’s tier, 
more validity should be given to the subjective recommendation during the 
decision making process. 
 
 Submitted Computed Tier vs. Commander’s Recommended Tier for Figure 11. 
Approved Reenlistments FY 2013-2014  
After considering the trends in performance indicators and applying a 
modified computed tier to the pre-tier data, I now have three measures of quality 
that I will further analyze using linear regression analysis. To capture the initial 
effects of the computed tier, I construct Table 10 to highlight the differences in 
quality by category and established metrics. Although the computed tier and 
commander’s recommendations reflect a decrease in quality or a marginal 
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in the data. PFT and CFT scores are large portions of the computed tier and 
have noticeable increases between the two reenlistment periods. Proficiency and 
conduct marks have hovered around the same values. The large, negative 
percent change in commander’s recommended tiers is related to the inflation of 
scores as discussed earlier. 
 Difference in Difference Matrix Table 10.  
 
 
D. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
In an effort to answer the primary and secondary questions regarding 
reenlistment processing times and how a Marine’s EAS affects the retention of 
high quality Marines, the following regressions listed below used the computed 
submitted tier, commander’s recommended tier, and modified tier score as 
measures of quality and the dependent variable. For the purposes of the 
regression analysis, the computed submitted tier refers to the modified computed 
tier for pre-tier data and the actual computed tier for FY 2013-2014 data. The 
third equation refers to the score generated from PFT scores and proficiency and 
conduct marks applied to both reenlistment periods.  
1) QTier = βo + β1Reenlistment Status + β2Time Constraint*Reenlistment Status + 
β3Submission Month (or Approval Month)*Reenlistment Status + u 
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2) QCo Rec = βo + β1Reenlistment Status + β2Time Constraint*Reenlistment 
Status + β3Submission Month (or Approval Month)*Reenlistment Status + u 
 
3) QModTier = βo + β1Reenlistment Status + β2Time Constraint*Reenlistment Status 
+ β3Submission Month (or Approval Month)*Reenlistment Status + u 
 
The outcome of these regressions is an aggregate measure of quality for 
Marines who are approved for reenlistment during a particular month. What is 
also factored into these models is a time constraint variable that accounts for a 
Marine’s EAS in relation to the RELM submission date. Interacting these terms 
with a Marine’s reenlistment status determines the overall quality retained based 
on when the RELM was submitted and within what time period. I focus on 
Marines approved for reenlistment in the regression analysis to isolate quality 
that the Marine Corps approved for reenlistment. 
The time constraints evaluated range from 30 days to 450 days prior to a 
Marine’s EAS and are grouped in independent 30-day intervals. The time 
constraint interacted with the reenlistment status explains how quality is affected 
when a Marine submits for reenlistment during that period. Additionally, each 
month was interacted with the reenlistment status to show the effects of 
reenlistment windows on retention quality. The expected heavy reenlistment 
periods are July, August, and September of each year. The reenlistment window 
for each upcoming fiscal year opens 1 July the previous fiscal year. The window 
for lateral moves that are not into high demand/low density MOS’s begins 1 
December of each year (MMEA, 2013).  
I estimated the effect of interactions and reenlistment statuses on three 
measures of quality: computed submitted tiers, recommended tiers, and modified 
tier scores. The computed submitted tiers for pre-tier data were generated from 
PFT scores and proficiency and conduct data from FTAP data provided by 
TFDW. The modified tier score provides a metric for quality in the FTAP cohort 
but does not differentiate between quality in MOSs. The modified tier score for 
pre-tier and computed tier data is helpful to compare raw quality between 
reenlistment years using different processes and metrics. The subjective 
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measure of quality, the commander’s recommendation, is also an important 
measure of quality used by both reenlistment processes and a gauge of 
changing quality throughout a reenlistment period. 
In order to determine the effect of submission window and submission 
month on the quality of reenlisting Marines, I developed a linear regression 
model for both pre-tier and computed tier time periods. The independent 
variables used in the linear regression consisted of submission window and 
submission month. The submission window is defined as the time between the 
formal submission date of the RELM to MMEA and the requesting Marine’s EAS. 
The reference group for submission window is any package submitted in excess 
of 420 days prior to a Marine’s EAS. The submission month is defined as the 
month in which the RELM was submitted to MMEA for processing. July, which is 
the start of the reenlistment period, is utilized as the reference month. These 
terms were interacted with a Marine’s approved status to determine the quality of 
Marines approved by submission window and month. The approved status is 
included as an independent variable to assess the overall quality of Marines 
approved, utilizing those who were disapproved as the reference group. I also 
control for fiscal year, utilizing 2009 as the pre-tier reference year and 2013 as 
the computed tier period reference year.  
1. Pre-Tier Model 
Three measures of quality were selected as the dependent variables for 
the linear regression model. The three measures of quality, defined as follows for 
the pre-tier model, are computed submitted tier, commander’s recommended tier, 
and modified tier score. The computed submitted tier is defined as a modified 
version of the existing computed tier using PFT, proficiency, and conduct 
markings from the eligible enlisted population. The commander’s recommended 
tier is defined as the commander’s subjective recommendation represented 
numerically with 1 being the highest numerical value for those enthusiastically 
recommended and 4 being the lowest. The modified tier score is defined as the 
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cumulative value of a Marine’s PFT, proficiency score, and conduct score. In 
Table 11, variables having a positive effect on quality in the computed submitted 
tier and commander’s recommended tier contribute to a lower score.  As for the 
modified tier score, variables that have a positive effect on quality contribute to a 
higher score.  
Table 11 shows the results of the pre-tier linear regression model for all 
three measures of quality. The coefficients show the change in average quality 
measure of those Marines approved compared to the reference group, greater 
than 420 days for submission window and July for submission month. As 
expected, the average approved quality increased for all three measures of 
quality in reference to those who were disapproved. The average measured 
quality for those Marines approved is 2.17 for computed submitted tier, 1.12 for 
commander’s recommended tier, and 1,141.72 for modified tier score. Looking at 
the fiscal years, average quality declines in 2010, but increases significantly in 
2011 compared to 2009. 
In Table 11, the model showed one submission window that is statistically 
significant (p < 0.05) for all three measures of quality. A submission window of 
less than 30 days prior to a Marine’s EAS is associated with 0.12 (5%) lower 
computed submitted tier quality, 0.15 (13%) lower quality in commander’s 
recommended tier quality, and 6.69 (0.5%) lower quality in modified tier score 
quality compared to those who submit earlier than 420 days from their EAS. The 
only other statistically significant submission windows are seen in reference to 
the commander’s recommended tier and show a trend of decreasing quality from 
a 91-120 day submission window through the 0-30 day submission window. 
Although the 181-210 submission window is also significant at the 1% 
significance level, there is no identifiable trend for later submission windows. 
With regard to the submission month, Table 11 reveals that every month, 
except June, has associated lower quality, at the 5% significance level on the 
value of all three quality measures. From the start of the reenlistment period, 
each month shows a reduction in quality relative to average approved quality of 
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those submitting in July. The computed submitted tier results show June, July, 
and August have the highest quality throughout the reenlistment period, with 3% 
lower quality in August for computed submitted tier quality compared to July. 
September through April have 4%-5% lower quality in computed submitted tier 
quality compared to those who submit in July. The biggest decline in quality is 
seen in the month of May with a 9% lower associated quality in computed 
submitted score relative to July submissions.  
For the commander’s recommended tier, there is a statistically significant 
(p<0.01) decline in quality which trends down from August to May. The 
commander’s recommended tier shows 5% lower quality in August and trends 
down to 15% lower quality in May compared to July submissions, showing that 
commander’s recommendation decreases over the course of the reenlistment 
period. For the modified tier score, each submission month was statistically 
significant (p<0.05); however, the quality measure is never lower by more than 
1% compared to July submissions and there is no readily distinguishable trend. 
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 Regression Results for Pre-Tier Approved Data Table 11.  
 
 
2. Computed Tier Model 
Three measures of quality were used again as the dependent variables for 
the linear regression model with computed tier data from FY 2013-2014. The 
three measures of quality, defined as follows for the computed tier model, are 
computed submitted tier, commander’s recommended tier, and modified tier 
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score. The computed submitted tier is defined as a modified version of the 
existing computed tier using PFT, proficiency, and conduct markings from the 
eligible enlisted population. The commander’s recommended tier is defined as 
the commander’s subjective recommendation represented numerically with 1 
being the highest numerical value for those enthusiastically recommended and 4 
being the lowest. The modified tier score is defined as the cumulative value of a 
Marine’s PFT, proficiency score, and conduct score. In Table 12, variables 
having a positive effect on quality in the computed submitted tier and 
commander’s recommended tier contribute to a lower score.  As for the modified 
tier score, variables that have a positive effect on quality contribute to a higher 
score.  
Table 12 shows the results of the computed tier linear regression model 
for all three measures of quality. The coefficients show the change in average 
quality measure of those Marines approved compared to the reference group, 
greater than 420 days for submission window and July for submission month. 
February is omitted from the regression due to a lack in observations.  Again, the 
average approved quality increased for all three measures of quality in reference 
to those who were disapproved. The average measured quality for those Marines 
approved is 2.11 for computed submitted tier, 1.74 for commander’s 
recommended tier, and 1,147.63 for modified tier score. Looking at the fiscal 
years, average quality improves in 2014 relative to FY 2013. 
In Table 12, the model showed two submission windows that were 
marginally statistically significant (p<0.10) for the modified tier score at 0-30 days 
and the computed submitted tier at 61-90 days. Both values signify 
improvements to quality relative to those who submit earlier than 420 days.  A 
statistically significant value and improvement to quality (p<0.05) is seen at the 
151-180 mark for the computed submitted tier. No discernable reason for 
improvement for this point in time is distinguishable. Values for all other time 
periods and quality measures were insignificant.  
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Now taking into consideration submission month, Table 12 reveals that 
every month, except June, has a statistically significant (p<0.05) impact on the 
value of all three quality measures. Like the pre-tier data, from the start of the 
reenlistment period, each month shows a reduction in quality relative to average 
approved quality of those submitting in July. Again, the computed submitted tier 
results show June, July, and August have the highest quality throughout the 
reenlistment period, with August associated with 2% lower quality in computed 
submitted tier compared to July. The computed tier data does display a periodic 
trend for the computed submitted tier measure of quality.  From August to 
October, quality is 2% to 7% lower relative to those who submit in July. Likewise 
from November to January, quality is 4% to 11.5% lower relative to those who 
submit in July. The last iteration is from March to May.  Compared to July 
submissions, quality for those approved declines by 5% to 11.5%.  
For the commander’s recommended tier, statistically significant values 
(p<0.01) are present for all values from August to May. In line with the computed 
submitted tier measure of quality, the commander’s recommended tier displays a 
periodic decline in quality for the same month groups. August to November 
recommended quality is 6% to 12% lower than compared to July submissions. 
November to January, reflect 9% to 17% lower quality relative to those who 
submit in July and lastly, March through May reflect 10% to 19% lower quality in 
comparison to July. For the modified tier score, each submission month was 
statistically significant (p<0.05); however, the quality measure never decreases 
by more than 0.9% relative to July submissions. A similar declining period trend 
is seen for the modified tier score with percent changes ranging from 0.3% to 
0.9% in comparison to July submissions.  
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 Regression Results for Computed Tier Approved Data Table 12.  
 
 
3. Pre-Tier and Computed Tier Model Comparison 
In comparing the pre-tier model and computed tier model, the following 
significant results can be stated regarding the impact of the submission window, 
or the significance of a Marine’s EAS on RELM processing. One of the notable 
submission windows from the pre-tier data was from 0-30 days before a Marine’s 
EAS and its negative effect on quality. In the computed tier data, this effect does 
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not appear.  In fact, quality improves at the 1% significance level in the modified 
tier score measure of quality. A progressive decline in quality, in the 
commander’s recommended tier category, was seen from 91-120 days to the 
closest window only in pre-tier data. All other outputs for the computed tier data 
either lacked significance or displayed no discernable trend. 
To address the question regarding quality over the fiscal year, every 
submission month, excluding June, in both regression models and, excluding 
February in the computed tier model, were highly statistically significant. Both 
models are consistent with quality declining as the reenlistment period 
progresses. The negative trend, measured in percentages, was more gradual for 
the pre-tier model but periodic for the computed tier model. Currently, the trends 
in declining quality can be partially explained relative to the start of the 
reenlistment window (July) and in relation to the start of the lateral move period in 
December. The least periodic of all three quality measures was the modified tier 
score; however, this metric also showed a consistent decline over the 
reenlistment period. 
E. ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 
Some insight into stakeholder involvement, but not incentives, is seen 
through the graphical analysis. The addition of the computed tier provides an 
objective anchor for commanders’ recommendations. There is no evidence of 
incentive and objective mismatch. On EAS’s, there is some evidence that the 0-
30 day submission window for pre-tier Marines is associated with lower quality, 
but this does not appear in computed tier data. Changes over the reenlistment 
period are evident in both sets of data. Relative to July, at the start of the 
reenlistment period, higher quality is retained at the start and later months are 
associated with lower quality. The change in pre-tier data is more gradual, but 
the computed tier data presented a periodic declining trend. Lastly, with limited 
data on complete reenlistment cohorts, the assessment of overall quality 
changing since the introduction of the computed tier cannot be determined. The 
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difference in difference matrix suggests that there was no significant change 
overall with the given data and limitations on generating comparable tiers for pre-
tier data.  
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. DISCUSSION 
My research sought to answer the primary question of how quality 
changes over the course of the reenlistment period for first-term Marines in 
relation to stakeholders and under the recently implemented tier system. In 
support of this primary question, I posed the following secondary questions: 
 Where are incentives and objectives mismatched at each level of 
processing for stakeholders?  
 How does a Marine’s expiration of active service (EAS) impact the 
processing of their reenlistment request?  
 Does quality change over the course of the fiscal year to include 
the reenlistment periods and lateral move periods?  
 How has the quality of the enlisted force selected for reenlistment 
changed since the introduction of the tier evaluation system?  
I address each question based on the results from my literature review in 
Chapter II and my analysis in Chapter IV.  
On the question of mismatched objectives and incentives, I map the role 
of stakeholders in the reenlistment process from RELM initiation to decision. 
Following a critical review of each stakeholder’s role in the RELM process, there 
were no direct incentives identified to prioritize the retention of the highest quality 
Marines. Although this is a primary objective of the retention process, incentives 
continue to be aligned toward meeting quantity objectives.  
Commanders are one of the most influential stakeholders through their 
recommendations and have the responsibility to take action in the best interest of 
the Marine Corps by virtue of their authority. Analyzing the data, there is an 
identified bias and a tendency to inflate recommendations in pre-tier observations 
and continued even with the computed tier. The addition of the computed has 
added an objective anchor to place subjective recommendations in context, 
reducing the amount of inflation by commanders. Even as commanders aim to 
 56 
make recommendations in the best interest of the Marine Corps, there is a 
tendency to view one’s own Marines as better than average, reducing the impact 
that their positive recommendations can have in the process. Conversely, 
commanders’ recommendations can positively impact the quality retained if their 
negative endorsements are given additional weight.  
Career planners have an obligation to process a RELM regardless of the 
Marine’s quality and time allowed for processing. While there is no direct 
evidence of RELM prioritization by EAS, the slightly lower levels of quality seen 
within the 0-30 day reenlistment window in pre-tier data may be a symptom of 
this occurrence at the unit level before the objective anchor was introduced.  
MMEA has published guidance which identifies quality as an important 
aspect of the reenlistment process. Until recently, there was no change to the 
process to address this focus on quality. In the process, the FTAP Chief is the 
approval authority, but not denial authority, and the default decision is built into 
the process is approval as long as there is no misconduct in the RELM. The 
process is more thorough for those with misconduct, but not those who may be 
tier 3 or tier 4 Marines without misconduct. 
In relation to a Marine’s EAS, in pre-tier data, negative effects on quality 
were mainly evident in all three measures of quality in the 0-30 day submission 
window. Results from computed tier data show no evidence of this same 
phenomenon, suggesting that the introduction of the tiers has reduced or 
eliminated rushed processing of lower quality Marines. A progressive decline in 
commander’s recommended tier for pre-tier results was seen from 91-120 days 
in, but this effect is not present in the computed tier data. In fact, the only 
significant results for computed tier data submission window indicated higher 
quality, but the correlation or cause relative to the time period is unknown. 
What was consistent between the pre-tier and computed tier periods was 
that the quality of approved reenlistments does change over the course of the 
reenlistment year. Higher levels of quality are approved at the beginning of the 
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reenlistment window in July and the quality decreases throughout the entire 
reenlistment period with the lowest quality in May. Small improvements are 
observed right before the lateral move period begins.  Computed tier data shows 
a progressive decline over the reenlistment year, but occurring periodically and 
the trend is more consistent between computed submitted tiers and 
commander’s recommended tiers. Percent changes in the modified tier score 
from both data sets never exceed 1% and the same decline in quality is observed 
over the reenlistment period. Although months later in the reenlistment period are 
associated with lower quality, this shows a preference to approve higher quality 
Marines earlier in the reenlistment process. 
There are clear differences between the reenlistment processes, but not a 
proven difference in the quality of Marine retained according to the regression 
results. Analyzing reenlistment data on entire eligible cohorts would allow for 
greater inferences about the reenlistment populations. After considering the 
average qualities of reenlistments from each period, specific metrics show 
increases, but overall quality using the three measures did not improve. 
Additionally, while the percentage of tier 3 and 4 Marine approved for 
reenlistment has decreased, 70% of tier 4 Marines are still being offered 
reenlistment. Marines in the bottom 10% of their reenlistment cohort may be 
better replaced through the accessions process.   
B. LIMITATIONS 
There were several limitations in this study. I was able to gather only 
partial data on entire pre-tier reenlistment populations to generate a modified tier 
score. Additionally, there was limited archived pre-tier performance data 
associated with those who reenlisted. A better understanding of quality within the 
eligible force population could be gathered from following a cohort from initial 
enlistment to the decision point of reenlistment during the first-term contract. My 
models also did not control for differences in MOS since my focus was on 
aggregate quality. A more segmented study can address the changes in quality 
 58 
by MOS with the computed tier cutoffs tied to the occupational specialty in 
question.  
The lack of FY 2012 data limited the full understanding of the effects of the 
computed tier on identifying and retaining quality since its implementation.  In 
order to mitigate the effects of the shortcomings in the data, I created measures 
of quality through a modified tier score and pre-tier computed submitted tier to 
make results more robust.  
C. STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are several recommendations following the conclusion of this 
research that can be implemented to improve quality or make improvements in 
reenlistment quality more apparent.  
There are two routing methods for RELMs depending on the presence of 
misconduct. If the context of the RELM contains misconduct, additional 
stakeholders weigh in on the validity of retaining the individual. A commander’s 
recommendation which shows a downgrade in computed tier could be viewed as 
adverse material to ensure more thorough screening much like misconduct to 
account for factors that are seen in the command but missed by the computed 
tier.  
The author recommends that the Marine Corps track and record quality 
indicators of all individuals eligible to reenlist to further identify and measure 
quality that can positively impact the career enlisted force. Further research is 
recommended due to the young age of the tier program. Follow on analysis 
should be completed on the fast track processing of tier 1 computed Marines 
since announcement of the policy in May 2013. The continued prioritization of top 
tier Marines should be emphasized to ensure that unit submissions reflect the 
policy change.  
Incentives should be provided to career planners and units for increasing 
the number of tier 1 and 2 Marines to submit for reenlistment. Increasing the pool 
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of Marines who submit would provide the Marine Corps with the ability to be 
more selective and reduce the percent of tier 4 Marines approved for 
reenlistment. The career force “requirement” is primarily quantity driven but 
increases in the reenlistment pool can shift the focus more to quality.  
Additionally, updates to Marine Corps Order 1040.31 should be made to 
include modifications such as the computed tier. Understandably, changes to 
retention policies during a drawdown are constant and currently published 
policies have not been consolidated into the retention order. The Marine Corps 
should continue the 100 percent contact policy for reenlistments and archive data 
on each fiscal year’s FTAP population. The analysis of historical data can help 
predict trends in force propensities and identify qualities within reenlistment 
subpopulations to better manage careerist experience levels.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The following questions and discussion points are relevant for future 
research in the subject of enlisted retention. Many are products of the research 
initiated on the computed tier reenlistment process and a better understanding of 
stakeholder involvement.  
How do we increase the number of tier 1 Marines who apply for 
reenlistment? Are reenlistment incentives the correct means or can we improve 
quality by better recruiting and screening Marines? This raises the question of 
whether measures of recruit quality should be changed to better predict potential 
at the earliest point and what controls can be added to ensure a consistent 
increase in quality in the force. Tying into recruiting, the cost/benefit of retaining a 
tier 4 Marine over increasing the accession requirement for a FTAP quota can 
also be reviewed.  
The career planner is relied upon heavily to ensure the reenlistment of 




point that they are not as effective in the retention mission? The responsibilities 
of a career planner are not only on FTAP Marines, but STAP and transitioning 
personnel.  
Updates to Marine Corps Order 1040.31 should be made to include 
modifications such as the computed tier. To address any concern regarding the 
validity of the computed tier in capturing and accurately measuring the leadership 
potential and other intangible qualities of a Marine, the proficiency and conduct 
rating scale should be reevaluated. By their definitions as listed in the IRAM, the 
proficiency and conduct scores are indicators of a Marine’s leadership, initiative, 
bearing, and physical and moral fitness (USMC, 2000).  
Additionally, rifle scores are less correlated to a Marine’s computed tier 
than any of the contributing factors. This may indicate that rifle scores are not 
good predictors of success or if they are, they should be more heavily weighted. 
In contrast, MCMAP belt points are highly correlated to a Marine’s computed tier, 
but the point value for this metric is insignificant. Other skills or milestones such 
as education attainment or professional qualifications could be incorporated to 
better differentiate between Marines. Research into predictors of success in 
FTAP Marines is recommended to improve the computed tier.  
Overall, the combination of objective and subjective components add 
validity to the RELM in assessing a Marine’s potential for future service. The 
strength of the tier system is that a comparative ranking for each year cohort is 
provided and adjusts accordingly. The Marine Corps has improved procedures to 
assist with the selection of the most highly qualified rather than the selection of 
merely the “first to volunteer.”  An increase in quality is possible if incentives are 
properly aligned to take advantage of available information both at the unit and 
MMEA level.  
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